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Too Strong for Principle:   
An Examination of the Theory and Philosophical 
Implications of Evolutionary Ethics 
 
Sam Rayner 
 
“. . . Nature is always too strong for principle.  And though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or 
others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most 
trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every 
point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who 
never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches.” 
David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 
Evolutionary ethics is a discipline that has formed around the belief 
that human-kind’s conception of morality was developed through the 
evolutionary process of natural selection. Various mechanisms concern-
ing the evolution of morality have been proposed within the theory of 
natural selection, and I believe that many authors in the field focus too 
narrowly on one or a few of them in their efforts to model the origins 
of morality. In this paper I hope to present a broader review of many 
potential evolutionary mechanisms and the evidence supporting them, 
in an effort to show that they are not mutually exclusive and may have 
all played a role in the formation of components of the complex moral 
system that exists today. Many writers in the field of evolutionary ethics 
tend to focus too narrowly on either the biological mechanisms 
through which morality is proposed to have evolved, or else on the 
philosophical ramifications that an acceptance of evolutionary ethics 
would have for our current conception of morality. As I feel that both 
aspects are equally important for the proper understanding and 
application of evolutionary ethics I hope to give equal and detailed 
attention to both the biological theory and the resultant philosophical 
implications.   
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Philosophically, evolutionary ethics provides support for an error 
theoretical view of morality.1 If accepted, especially as support for error 
theory, the evolved nature of the institution of morality poses a serious 
problem for traditional views of morality.  I argue that common moral 
practice involves an implicit appeal to categorical and objective 
standards and that if our moral feelings can be shown to arise from 
nothing more than our biologically constituted nature, our invocation 
of universally prescriptive moral imperatives is in error.  If it is true that 
the practice of morality consists of such imperative statements, an 
examination of the philosophical implications of evolutionary ethics is 
in order. Interestingly, examining the theory of evolutionary ethics, one 
can see that the predictions it makes about the operation of morality 
are nearly identical to a Humean depiction of human morality. The 
relationship between Hume’s writing and the predictions of evolution-
ary theory makes an examination of Hume’s philosophical conclusions 
pertinent to our understanding of the subject. Drawing from Hume’s 
conclusions I argue that if the institution of morality can be shown to 
be based in humankind’s evolutionary past, this fact would seriously 
undermine the possibility of an ultimate philosophical justification of the 
foundations of morality, though it would not undermine the practice of 
morality.  Evolutionary theory, as I interpret it, shows human society to 
be foundationally dependent on the validity of morality. I attempt to 
show that much of human social interaction is based on moral prin-
ciples (such as altruism), and strategies that grew from the existence of 
moral interaction (gossip, reputation building, and “cheating,” for 
example). It then follows that when acting or reasoning within a social 
or “everyday” context, it makes no sense to ask whether morality’s 
foundational principles can be justified, because they are a non-
negotiable component of social interaction. While philosophically 
morality may be founded in error, by distinguishing between societal 
and philosophical contexts it may be possible to retain moral discourse 
in its present form, and indeed it may be impossible to do otherwise. 
 
1 The concept of an error theory is discussed in greater detail further on in this paper.  Briefly, 
error theory is the notion that moral discourse is phrased in cognitive terms (consisting of 
true/false statements of fact), but that all moral claims are actually false as no such objective moral 
“facts” exist. 
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Arguments for an Evolutionary Origin of Morality 
Evolutionary ethics originated in the 1850's in the works of 
Herbert Spencer (1850).2 The theory gained some support and was 
debated throughout the nineteenth century until the criticisms of many 
philosophers, notably Thomas Huxley (1893) and G. E. Moore (1903), 
all but completely defeated the popularity of biological interpretations 
of morality.  The field of evolutionary ethics, until relatively recently, 
remained plagued by bad interpretation of scientific research and un-
founded speculation (such as the faulty idea that altruism originated via 
the process of group selection).  The emergence of new theories of 
altruistic evolution, however, caused evolutionary ethics to experience a 
resurgence. This resurgence was brought about largely by E. O. 
Wilson’s seminal work: Sociobiology (1975), the development of 
Hamilton’s theory of kin selection and the concept of inclusive fitness 
(1964), Trivers’ hypothesis of the evolution of reciprocal altruism 
(1971), and the application of mathematical and game-theoretical 
models to evolutionary theory (e.g. Smith and Price, 1973). Today, evo-
lutionary ethics is certainly a tenable position, with a breadth of empir-
ical and theoretical evidence supporting it.  
 
The Claims of Evolutionary Ethics 
While ordinarily definitions of altruism take account of factors such 
as motivation, evolutionary ethicists often employ a functional con-
ception of altruism which is concerned merely with behavior. 
Biologically altruistic acts, defined as acts performed that benefit 
another organism at a cost to the provider with no immediate benefit to 
the provider, include most of the actions and feelings we consider to be 
moral. Altruism and cooperation which require the abandonment of 
some individual drives provide the necessary foundation for basic 
human morality. Sociobiologists, therefore, try to show that co-
operation and altruism are evolutionary products, in order to provide 
support for the idea that the resulting institution of morality which is 
built on them is evolutionarily derived.   
Before going any further, however, one may very well ask what 
reasons exist to assume that our system of morality is a product of 
evolutionary factors. First of all, the cooperation and altruism which 
underlie human morality can be observed throughout nature and can be 
2Spencer’s first ideas, although they predate Darwin’s theory of natural selection, form the origins 
for evolutionary ethics.
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shown to be evolutionarily selected for. Sociobiology gives a con-
vincing explanation of the origin of altruism in human society by 
invoking the method of natural selection because in the sociobiological 
model morality can be shown to be biologically beneficial. Additionally, 
I believe that as human beings, presumably, are a result of evolutionary 
processes, the neural structures which provide moral sentiments such 
as guilt, shame, and moralistic aggression must have been subject to 
evolutionary pressure, as those biological structures must have been 
shaped to produce the emotions that humans associate with morality. 
As (in my Humean interpretation) emotional centers are critically im-
portant to morality, this is reason enough to examine morality in an 
evolutionary light. E.O. Wilson expresses this in a famous passage 
where he states that 
The biologist, who is concerned with the questions of physiology and evolutionary history, 
realizes that self-knowledge is constrained and shaped by the emotional control centers in 
the hypothalamus and limbic system of the brain.  These centers flood our consciousness 
with all the emotions - hate, love, guilt, fear and others - that are consulted by ethical 
philosophers who wish to intuit the standards of good and evil.  What, we are then 
compelled to ask, made the hypothalamus and limbic system?  They evolved by natural 
selection.  That simple biological statement must be pursued to explain ethics. . . (Wilson, 
1975, p. 1) 
 
Beyond the observation of cooperation in nature and the neurological 
basis of moral emotions (evidence which may not satisfy those who 
hold morality to be an undertaking solely of the reason), rudiments of 
human morality are evident in non-human primates and are hypo-
thesized to have existed in the direct ancestor of humans before the 
evolution of language and higher consciousness which suggests that an 
ability to view the world in moral terms is not a result of advanced 
human culture or reason. Finally, the picture of morality which is 
painted by relying on evolutionary models such as reciprocal altruism 
and kin selection (discussed below) is very similar to the moral practice 
that is observed today. These points will be discussed in more detail 
further on. 
Another initial criticism of evolutionary ethics is that the extensive 
cross-cultural variation in substantive morality seems to contradict a 
theory proposing underlying biological similarities in human morality.  
Although it is true that what humans see as right and wrong certainly 
varies across cultures, I argue that all humans have evolved to perceive 
their culture’s moral laws in a similar way.  Moral utterances are used in 
a very different way from other societal discourse; moral statements are 
always felt to contain what Richard Joyce refers to as “imperative 
force” in that conclusive moral judgments are felt to override all other 
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reasoning. Joyce argues that moral laws are categorical and necessarily 
imperative, containing what Philippa Foot refers to as a “fugitive 
thought” which makes them appear binding independently of human 
society and applicable universally, properties that are not held by any 
social rules or laws (Joyce, 2001). This is something that will be 
discussed in greater detail in the second section of this paper, but it is 
crucial to note at this point that human beings distinguish moral laws 
from other rules of conduct and feel morality to be binding on them in 
a manner unique from other laws.   
What evolutionary theory proposes is that we have evolved the 
category of morality as a biologically useful adaptation.  Although there 
do appear to be examples of universal moral prohibitions, a socio-
biological approach to morality goes beyond arguing that what we see as 
right or wrong is evolutionarily based, or that certain moral proclivities 
that we have were formed by evolution. What evolutionary ethics 
claims is that our entire system of morality is evolutionarily derived; that 
the ability to view actions and categorize the world in moral terms is a 
biological adaptation. While much of (if not the majority of) the 
content of human moral systems is culturally or socially derived, the 
fact that we even have such a thing as morality is argued to be an 
evolutionary instilled adaptation.   
That morality could have evolved as a biologically useful 
adaptation, however, is counterintuitive. Cooperative acts among 
humans in general, not to mention altruistic actions, are at odds with 
the fact that natural selection leads individuals to attempt to maximize 
their own reproductive fitness. A maximization of individual fitness is 
the very definition of natural selection; Michael Ruse refers to evolution 
as “selfishness personified” (Ruse 1986) and many scientists such as 
Thomas Huxley have argued that the goal of morality was to combat the 
selfish processes of evolution that are at work in human beings (Huxley 
and Huxley 1947). This argument appears throughout contemporary 
criticism of sociobiology as well. (See, for example, Woolcock’s article 
“The Case Against Evolutionary Ethics Today” [Ruse and Maien-
schein, 1999].) How, then, could altruism, which requires the mitigation 
of selfish desires, arise from the inherently brutal and selfish process of 
natural selection? Much of the problem in establishing the mechanisms 
by which morality could have evolved lies in first showing that co-
operation and altruistic behavior could hypothetically arise via the 
selfish mechanism of natural selection.   
An early proposal of a mechanism by which altruism could have 
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evolved was group selection, the idea that natural selection can act 
upon groups as well as individuals. A cooperative group of organisms 
practicing altruism would survive better than a group of selfish and 
competitive individuals. David Sloan Wilson (1983) gives a good 
background on the history of group selection, writing that many 
biologists, such as “Fisher, Haldane, and Wright, however, all em-
phasized that evolution within single populations could not explain 
group-level adaptations.” For a long time group selection was a dom-
inant paradigm and the sole explanation of how altruism could have 
arisen. 
There are many problems surrounding the idea that group selection 
is the main force operating to select for altruism, however. Chief 
among these is the simple fact that one selfish individual migrating into 
or being born into an altruistic group could easily exploit it by accepting 
the benefits of altruism without reciprocating. A selfish individual that 
exploited the altruism of the group would easily flourish and pass his 
selfish traits on, something that Richard Dawkins refers to as “sub-
version from within” (1976). This argument against group selection 
(among other arguments against it) was proposed by George Williams 
(1966) and was sufficient to remove discussions of group selection 
from most mainstream scientific discussion for a long time.3
Fortunately for a sociobiological understanding of morality, around 
the time of Williams’ criticisms of group selection a wealth of new 
theory was introduced that revitalized the field of evolutionary ethics.  
Biological, mathematical, and economic models have been created that 
show how acting “altruistically” can actually be in the individual organ-
ism’s own genetic self interest, and therefore in accord with the 
“selfish” nature of natural selection and rendering an appeal to group 
selection unnecessary. 
 
Theoretical Support for the Evolution of Cooperative and Altruistic Behavior 
An important development in evolutionary theory in general after 
the theory of natural selection put forth in Darwin’s seminal work The 
Origin of Species was combined with Mendel’s theory of genetic in-
heritance was that scientists began to realize that selection must occur 
3 Recently group selection has come under discussion again and has gained many new supporters.  
The “new” group selection theorists, however, not only have different conceptions of group 
selection, but they no longer see group selection as the only mechanism operating in the formation 
of behaviors such as altruism.  Later on I discuss how group selection may possibly operate in 
addition to many other important mechanisms.   Still, it is certainly not the only mechanism (nor 
likely the main mechanism) by which altruism came into existence as early theorists claimed. 
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on a genetic level as well as an organismal level. Genes that led to an 
increase in reproductive fitness for the organism were more likely to be 
passed on and it began to appear that the genes were the fundamental 
units of selection rather than individual organisms. As theories of 
genetic selection began to progress, it began to appear that essentially 
the organism may be no more than a way for genes to propagate 
themselves (see Dawkins, 1976). 
Hamilton’s development of the idea of inclusive fitness and kin 
selection was of key importance to an understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying the evolution of cooperative behavior in 
animals (Hamilton, 1964). Building on the increasing understanding of 
genetic inheritance Hamilton proposed that an individual (who has 
evolved, according to evolutionary theory, to attempt to pass on his or 
her genes) will benefit reproductively by helping related individuals 
under conditions where the condition r>c/b is met, r being the 
coefficient of genetic relatedness (e.g., .5 for an individual’s offspring or 
siblings and .125 for first cousins), c being the cost to the organism 
helping his relative, and b being the benefit to the relative being helped.  
This notion was termed “inclusive fitness,” and it helps explain the 
evolution of altruistic behavior among related individuals, which is one 
reason that Maynard Smith proposed the term “kin selection” for 
Hamilton’s model (Smith, 1964). 
Hamilton’s model may be influential in showing why genetically 
related individuals would have evolved to cooperate, but morality 
obviously extends beyond the confines of kinship. What were now 
needed were theoretical models accounting for the evolution of al-
truism among unrelated individuals. Robert Trivers (1971) formulated a 
model to account for how reciprocal altruism could have evolved by 
natural selection alone. Trivers postulated that altruism could have 
evolved in animals such as humans because their long lives and close 
living proximity allow for many potentially altruistic interactions in day 
to day life.  Using a simple example of a drowning man Trivers shows 
that cooperation between two individuals could be selected for. If a 
man is drowning and faces a 50% chance of dying and his potential 
rescuer is almost certain to save him, but faces a 1 in 20 chance of 
drowning himself if he attempts the rescue it is clear that if this is an 
isolated incident natural selection favors letting him drown. However, if 
the individual contemplating the rescue is likely to be drowning some 
day and the drowning individual is likely to reciprocate if saved, both 
individuals will benefit if they save each other.   
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Invoking the use of prisoner’s dilemma to characterize the inter-
action between two organisms repeatedly exposed to situations where 
altruism is possible Trivers explains that if many such interactions oc-
cur, with each individual alternately in the position of being benefited 
or incurring a cost, both individuals will benefit if both cooperate and 
suffer if neither do. The greatest benefit would arise from “cheating,” 
which is taken here to mean refusing to reciprocate an altruistic act in 
the future, but this would be detrimental to the individual being 
cheated. Due to the possibility of cheating, individuals would not 
benefit from dispersing altruism at random throughout the entire 
population as all other individuals would have an incentive to cheat. If, 
however, individuals distribute altruism non-randomly based on the 
altruistic tendencies of potential recipients, with systems to detect and 
discriminate against cheaters, altruistic genes would be able to thrive in 
the population as altruistic individuals would benefit from mutualistic 
relationships with other altruistic individuals. 
Discussing the complexity of the system of reciprocal altruism 
among human beings, Trivers states that 
[g]iven this unstable character of the system, where a degree of cheating is adaptive, natural 
selection will rapidly favor a complex psychological system in each individual regulating both 
his own altruistic and cheating tendencies. As selection favors subtler forms of cheating, it 
will favor more acute abilities to detect cheating. The system that results should simul-
taneously allow the individual to reap the benefits of altruistic exchanges, to protect himself 
from gross and subtle forms of cheating, and to practice those forms of cheating that local 
conditions make adaptive. Individuals will differ not in being altruists or cheaters but in the 
degree of altruism they show and in the conditions under which they will cheat (Trivers, 
1971, p. 48).    
 
This explains the existence of complex friendship relations in human 
societies, as well as the existence of moralistic aggression towards 
cheaters. Trivers also discusses how complex emotions such as guilt, 
sympathy, trust, suspicion, and the mimicry of such emotions by subtle 
cheaters could result from such a system.   
Trivers’ model, however, depends upon repeated interactions 
between the same two organisms within a population for systems of 
altruism to develop because firsthand knowledge of the reliability of a 
cooperative “partner” is necessary to avoid gross cheating. In addition 
to kin selection and reciprocal altruism, humans also can be shown to 
practice “indirect reciprocity.” Indirect reciprocity refers to altruism 
based on the individual’s reputation for behaving altruistically with 
third parties, with expectations of eventual reciprocal altruism from 
another random individual in the population, not necessarily the one 
being helped. Mathematical models of indirect reciprocity assume that 
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individuals will interact one or zero times with other members of the 
population. The evolution of indirect reciprocity was important for 
altruism to exist within society as a whole rather than just between 
kinship groups, or groups of individuals with repeated interactions and 
detailed firsthand knowledge of each other. 
A review of the theory surrounding the emergence of indirect 
reciprocity was published recently by Martin Nowak and Karl Sigmund 
(2005). Focusing on systems of indirect reciprocity in humans they re-
emphasize the immense complexity of human systems of altruism. 
Nowak and Sigmund discuss the pivotal importance of reputation for 
systems of indirect reciprocity, noting that humans feel strongly about 
interactions that don’t even include them, citing the content and 
prevalence of gossip and the importance of the feedback left by prior 
buyers in internet auctions. An altruistic system based on, or including, 
indirect reciprocity would not work without an ability to refuse to help 
a “bad” player that has a reputation of cheating. Citing impressive and 
complex mathematical and economic models of cooperation, Nowak 
and Sigmund conclude that a detailed knowledge of others’ reputations 
is necessary for indirect altruism to be maintained within a population. 
Discrimination against individuals with poor reputations as cooperators 
causes individuals to be motivated to cooperate with other individuals 
with good reputations in order to build a reputation for themselves and 
obtain future reciprocation from members of the society. Nowak and 
Sigmund argue that indirect reciprocity can thrive within a “…socially 
viscous population, in which people can know each other’s 
reputation…” (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005, box 5, p. 1296). In the con-
clusion of their paper, Nowak and Sigmund state that “…indirect 
reciprocity based on reputation serves as a link between diverse forms 
of cooperative interaction. The moralistic assessment of the other 
members in the population, even if they are observed only at a distance, 
provides a powerful tool for channeling support towards those who 
collaborate and an incentive to join group efforts” (Nowak and Sig-
mund, 2005, p. 1296).   
In order to propose that strategies of reciprocity and kin selection 
could have led to the widespread adoption of cooperation in the animal 
kingdom and the complex social systems of altruism and cooperation 
seen in the human species, it must be shown that such strategies can be 
maintained successfully in a population. In their introduction of the 
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game theoretical4 concept of Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS), John 
Maynard Smith and George R. Price provided a formulized way to 
describe the establishment of stable strategies within a population 
(Smith and Price, 1973).5 As Smith puts it, “An ESS or evolutionarily 
stable strategy is a strategy such that, if all the members of a population 
adopt it, no mutant strategy can invade” (Smith, 1982). Therefore, 
“there is no ‘mutant’ strategy that would give higher reproductive 
fitness” (Smith and Price, 1973). When Trivers (although he was 
writing before Smith and Price’s work) and Nowak and Sigmund dis-
cuss a system of cooperation which involves ways to detect and 
discriminate against cheaters they are essentially explaining how the 
establishment of cooperation based on discrimination could lead to 
ESS because within the proposed group of discriminatory cooperators 
no mutant “cheaters” could invade the group. An implication of Smith 
and Price’s work is that in order to be perpetuated, a strategy must be 
evolutionarily stable within a population and therefore any theory 
attempting to account for the evolution of altruism must also meet this 
criteria.   
While the above models appear to accurately reflect the main 
forces that originally led to the evolution of cooperative and/or altru-
istic behavior within animal societies, it is almost certain that the com-
plexity of the behavior being studied is the result of the interplay of 
these forces along with other factors. In a recent review article Tim 
Clutton-Brock discusses alternate mechanisms that could be operating 
in the formation of cooperative behavior (Clutton-Brock, 2002). 
Clutton Brock discusses how seemingly cooperative behaviors could, in 
reality, be a result of by-product mutualism where an individual 
performs a behavior to maximize his or her own fitness directly and as 
an unintended result benefits those in his or her group as well. In other 
cases, he suggests, actions may be mutualistic in that both animals 
directly benefit from their cooperative behaviors, rather than receiving 
only the indirect benefits that helping kin members or increasing 
4 For those unfamiliar with the term, game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that has 
become influential in economic and biological modeling.  Game theory examines interactions 
between individuals or groups for which costs and benefits are not fixed, but dependent on the 
choices made by other players.  Game theory assumes that individuals are all attempting to 
maximize their individual gains, and examines the many potential strategies that they could adopt 
based on their knowledge of the other “players” motivations and past behavior.  A well known 
example of game theory is the “prisoner’s dilemma.” 
5 Smith and Price’s 1973 article addresses restraint in intraspecies conflict, and they developed the 
concept of an ESS as part of their theory of animal conflict.  The concept of an ESS is, however, 
readily applicable to other topics, such as the evolution of altruism.
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reputation confer. The simple fact that being in a group is beneficial, 
“group augmentation,” may explain the evolution of some cooperative 
societies. In some specialized cases, Clutton-Brock explains, it is even 
possible that coercion from the rest of the group drives certain 
seemingly “cooperative” behaviors. Other recent work suggests that 
group selection may play a role in the evolution of cooperative societies 
(Sober and Wilson, 1999). Although I believe, as discussed above, that 
group selection is not likely to be the primary mechanism at work in the 
formation of cooperative societies, it may be one more factor adding to 
natural selection for cooperative or altruistic behavior.   
Animal behavior, especially human behavior, is extremely 
complicated and given the nature of the evolutionary process the orig-
ination of altruism is likely to be the result of a multitude of factors.  
Richard Alexander points out that we by no means fully understand the 
underlying developmental and genetic mechanisms leading to human 
behaviors which evolution has influenced, but that we can ascertain 
beyond a reasonable doubt that such behaviors are evolutionary in 
nature: 
Understanding the general nature of evolution – long-term directional changes, and even the 
components of the evolutionary process and how they interact – may not be particularly 
difficult. Understanding the interaction of heredity and development well enough to assume 
an appropriate attitude with regard to the proximate background of behavior, however, is 
extremely difficult, and here the biological understanding of nonbiologists tends to break 
down…Having established that humans, as with other organisms, have indeed evolved to 
maximize inclusive fitness, biologists are now concentrating increasingly on underlying 
mechanisms of inclusive fitness maximizing behavior – hence development, physiology, 
learning, the nature and consequences of evolved phenotypic plasticity, and particularly the 
mechanisms of kin recognition and nepotism…The existence of such mechanisms can be 
established in any particular case merely through convincing evidence of evolved adaptive 
function. Characterization of the mechanism(s) on the other hand, requires knowledge of 
ontogenies, necessary and sufficient stimulus sequences, differential eases of learning, 
sensitive periods…and ideally even geographic location and functional interdependence 
within the central nervous system and with respect to the minimal sensorimotor units 
(Alexander 1993, page 168). 
 
I argue that it would be a serious error to assume that the origins of 
human morality can be fully explained by one or two major evolutionary 
mechanisms, or to assume that we have managed to fully characterize 
those mechanisms. (Alexander points out that our lack of an under-
standing of the exact interactions between genetics and behavior is one 
of the great gaps in biology.) That evolution as a whole is sufficient to 
explain the origin of cooperative and biologically altruistic behavior, 
however, seems to be a valid argument at this point.   
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Empirical Support for the Evolution of Cooperative and Altruistic Behavior 
The above section of my paper hoped to show that theoretical 
models have been developed showing the possibility that cooperative 
and altruistic behavior could have evolved in humans and other 
organisms via natural selection processes. Briefly, I hope to now show 
that there is well documented empirical evidence as well that human 
moral systems may be founded on biological inclinations. Ruse cites 
three kinds of empirical evidence that are used to support evolutionary 
ethics: evidence found in “lower” social animals, evidence in primate 
society, and evidence in human society. I make use of Ruse’s category-
ization here and draw heavily from his work, adding to it where 
necessary.   
To begin with, cooperative social behavior is found throughout the 
animal kingdom and Ruse notes that kin selection and reciprocal 
altruism are well documented among some social animals in the natural 
world. Kin selection is firmly established among the Hymenoptera 
(ants, bees, and wasps) who often have sterile “worker” females 
spending their lifetime raising their sisters without reproducing them-
selves.6 Ruse moves on to show that reciprocal altruism is evident in 
members of fish which are cleaned by others and then discusses 
reciprocal altruism among white-fronted bee-eater’s, a bird species in 
Africa which help rebuild each others’ nests when they are destroyed by 
the common flash floods in the areas. Ruse concludes that although we 
certainly do not interact in the same way that the above species do, the 
existence of cooperative and altruistic behavior in the natural world that 
has been convincingly shown to result from evolutionary processes 
raises the possibility that such behavior in the human species could be 
evolutionary in origin: 
Nevertheless, reference to social behavior in the animal world taken as a whole does show 
that such behavior – including co-operation and “altruism” – can be produced and 
promoted by natural selection, working at the level of the individual.  It can be done, and is 
in fact done time and again through the animal world. If humans are part of this world, 
possibilities and expectations are obviously raised (Ruse 1986, page 227). 
 
The empirical evidence found in primates is similar to that found in 
6 Hamilton used such eusocial insects to help demonstrate the operation of kin selection.  Because 
reproductive males are haploid while the reproductive female (the queen) is diploid, workers are 
75% related to their mother’s other offspring whereas they would only be 50% related to their 
own offspring were they to reproduce.  Their inclusive fitness, therefore, is maximized by caring 
for their “sisters” rather than reproducing themselves, and this likely led to the evolution of 
workers’ sterility. 
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“lower” social organisms although more applicable to humans not only 
because the higher primates are more genetically related to us, but also 
because their behavior is closer to what we consider “moral.” Ruse 
states that “[r]ecent, extended studies of the apes, particularly of 
chimpanzees must shake all but the most dogmatic defender of the 
uniqueness of the human moral capacity” (Ruse 1986, page 227) and 
believes that due to the gradual nature of evolution we should expect to 
find the rudiments of morality in our recent biological cousins if 
morality does indeed have a genetic basis. Christopher Boehm believes 
that by examining commonalities between humans and the two Pan 
species, Pan troglodytes and Pan paniscus (chimpanzees and bonobos, 
respectively), who are presumed to have originated from the same an-
cestor as humans, we can determine by triangulation what moral qual-
ities, if any, would have been present in our direct genetic ancestor 
(Boehm, 1998). If we can determine by triangulation that the common 
ancestor of humans and the two Pan species showed the rudiments of 
human morality, we can safely assume that at least the basis of our 
morality is evolutionary in nature, and not a recent culturally derived 
phenomenon.     
Boehm, who is examining conflict intervention and social control 
as driving forces in the evolution of social morality, concludes that 
bonobos and chimpanzees and humans all engage in similar methods of 
conflict resolution in the moral sense that he is examining.7 Flack and 
De Waal, reviewing the growing body of primatalogical research into 
morality, conclude after detailed examination of their own and other’s 
original research that: 
Many non-human primates, for example, seem to have similar methods to humans for 
resolving, managing, and preventing conflicts of interests within their groups. Such methods, 
which include reciprocity and food sharing, reconciliation, consolation, conflict intervention, 
and mediation, are the very building blocks of moral systems… (Flaak and De Waal, 2000). 
 
De Waal’s earlier conclusions which Ruse quotes may be even bolder 
than those of his 2000 collaboration with Flaak.  In a section cited by 
Ruse, De Waal concludes that “[i]n their social application of reason and 
thought, chimpanzees are truly remarkable. Technically their invent-
iveness is clearly inferior to that of human beings, but socially I would 
hesitate to make such a claim” (de Waal 1982, page 51). Ruse thinks 
7 As an interesting side note, Boehm sees language as the driving force causing the proto-moral 
behavior seen in primates to become the full blown morality seen in humans, partially due to the 
to origination of gossip (something also discussed Nowak and Sigmund, 2005 as mentioned 
above) and an ability to express moral sanctioning. 
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that De Waal’s 1982 study is important because it focuses on semi-wild 
chimpanzees at the Arnhem zoo instead of human raised captive 
chimpanzees that may have been “encultured” by their human care-
givers to exhibit human-like characteristics that are not innate. Even 
more important then, perhaps, may be Goodall’s ethological des-
criptions of wild chimpanzees’ behavior at the Gombe preserve. (See, 
for example, Goodall, 1971.) Her depiction of wild chimpanzee society 
includes dyadic relationships, complex and shifting social structure, 
moralistic aggression, and many other features that involve or promote 
the development of, morality. Though the evidence is not conclusive 
that higher primates are indeed moral beings, there are numerous 
studies that support the conclusion that higher primates, chimpanzees 
in particular, exhibit those characteristics that form the foundation of 
morality.   
Finally, there is growing evidence being collected on human society 
that supports the conception of morality as an evolved phenomenon.  
First of all, Ruse notes that: 
[t]here is growing evidence that Darwinian factors are important in a full causal under-
standing of human society. The explicit goals sought by humans tend to be power and status 
and material riches and the like. Also actively pursued are peace and security, freedom from 
war and want…Virtually all these things translate readily into reproductive success, and their 
absence spells reproductive failure (Ruse 1986, page 231). 
 
Ruse cites Napoleon Chagnon’s well known studies on the Yanomamo 
Indians as evidence for Darwinian factors in society.8 Ruse also cites 
Richard Alexander’s work which shows kin selection at work in human 
societies. For example, in many tribal societies where paternity is un-
certain, men will care for their sister’s offspring. This makes sense 
because they are 25% genetically related to their sister’s children while 
they are uncertain of their genetic relation to children which may or 
may not be their own. Reciprocal altruism seems to be in effect in 
human society as well; humans will interact equally with others and co-
operate altruistically as long as the other partner in the exchange recip-
rocates when possible. If one side fails to reciprocate, the dyadic 
relationship will dissolve. People will also hesitate to be altruistic 
towards someone known in society (through gossip) to “cheat” in re-
lationships and accept altruism without reciprocating. Ruse next 
discusses Marshall Salin’s theory that related humans exhibit gener-
alized reciprocity, non-relatives that are well-known engage in balanced 
8 Simply put, in Yanomamo society, those factors which reflect societal success also reflect 
evolutionary/ reproductive success.  For example, headmen generally have more wives which 
translates into more offspring. 
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reciprocity, and unknown or threatening individuals generally exhibit 
negative reciprocity. This is evidence for kin selection because it shows 
that reciprocal interactions decrease with decreasing relationship, as 
well as evidence for reciprocal altruism because frequency of inter-
action plays a role. These interactions are common throughout human 
societies, and reflect what would be expected were human moral inter-
actions the result of Darwinian factors.   
An important piece of evidence that can gathered from examining 
human societies that Ruse does not mention in detail is that there are 
commonalities in what humans find moral throughout, as far as is 
known, all societies. This evidence comes mostly from anthropological 
sources. Anthropologist Donald E. Brown’s book Human Universals 
comments on the universal aspects of human behavior (Brown, 1991).  
After extensive cross-cultural examination, Brown creates an imaginary 
race of people, the “Universal People (UP),” which reflects all of the 
traits held in common throughout all societies. In a brief discussion on 
morality he concludes that  
[t]he UP distinguish right from wrong, and at least implicitly, as noted earlier, recognize 
responsibility and intentionality. They recognize and employ promises. Reciprocity, also 
mentioned earlier, is a key element in their morality. So, too, is their ability to empathize.  
Envy is ubiquitous among the UP, and they have symbolic means for coping with its 
unfortunate consequences (Brown 1991, page 139). 
 
In an earlier list of universal societal traits George Murdock included 
such traits as cooperative labor, ethics, gift giving, hospitality, incest 
taboos, kin groups, sexual restrictions, food taboos, and residence rules 
among countless others, which reflect commonalities in moral, social, 
and cooperative practices (Murdock, 1945). Boehm adds “social bully-
ing,” restrictions on dominance, and the identification of deviance to 
the list of cultural universals (Boehm, 1998). Singer points out that 
Westermarck describes the “near universal prevalence among human 
societies of recognized obligations to kin, and notes that obligations 
weaken as the degree of kinship becomes less close,” and goes on to 
quote Alvin Gouldner’s conclusion that “contrary to some cultural 
relativists, it can be hypothesized that a norm of reciprocity is 
universal” (Singer 1982, page 49). The existence of universal common-
alities in human moral behavior, especially the common existence of 
reciprocity and obligations to kin (which factor heavily in biological 
analysis of evolutionary origins) and ideas of intentionality and 
responsibility, is very telling evidence that morality may be biologically 
derived. Although content differs cross-culturally, it appears that the 
structure of morality is similar across cultures, further supporting the 
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idea that it may be evolutionarily derived; were morality merely a 
function of culture one would expect radical cross-cultural differences 
in perceptions of morality, and even whether or not morality was 
employed at all. 
 
From Biological Altruism to Human Morality:  Filling in the Gaps  
At this point, anyone reading this essay may be beginning to feel as 
though a trick has been played on them. After all, cooperation and al-
truism in the biological sense may be necessary components of human 
morality, but they are certainly not sufficient. For an action to be 
termed moral people usually also discuss intentionality, an imperative 
force or sense of requirement, and the freedom to make one’s own 
moral choices, elements which seem to be missing from the above 
sociobiological account of morality. As an example of typical arguments 
against the completeness of evolutionary ethics, Alan Gewirth writes 
that 
[e]volutionary ethics takes its start from the important, and imaginatively gripping, biological 
phenomena that it calls altruistic behavior in lower animals.  But in trying to move from such 
behavior to human morality, it provides at most necessary conditions, not sufficient 
conditions. Its explanations fail to accommodate the intentionality that is characteristic of 
moral “oughts” and the kinds of answers to the distributive and substantive question that 
figure centrally in human morality (Nitecki and Nitecki, 1993). 
 
The distributive and substantive questions that Gewirth poses are 
both related to the issue of determinism. Evolutionary theory, however, 
does not end at the evolution of altruism. Nor, I argue, does a bio-
logical approach necessarily lead to determinism or ignore intentionality 
in ethics.   
I will first address criticism against the possibility of an evolu-
tionary basis of morality which holds that altruistic behavior in lower 
animals is a far cry from moral behavior in humans. That biological 
altruism is not on a par with complex ethical systems I certainly agree 
with. The simple and instinctual responses seen in lower organisms do 
not reflect the reasoning and decision-making processes which humans 
use to reach moral decisions. Evolutionary ethics, in my view, has little 
substantive import for ethical theory. Evolutionary theory makes few 
claims about how ethics should be carried out, what principles should 
guide our moral reasoning, and certainly does not associate human 
thought with instinctual animal behaviors. However, the very foun-
dations of our ethical thinking, evolutionary ethicists argue, are evolu-
tionarily instilled. The whole system of morality which humans have 
erected rests on a biological urge to partition the world as good and 
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bad, right and wrong, according to the cultural and individual 
experiences that an individual is exposed to interacting with innate 
biological tendencies. By showing that biological altruism, which an-
ticipates human principles of selflessness, charity, and sympathy likely 
has evolved, it can be inferred that such characteristics are evo-
lutionarily favored. “Lower” animals may have an instinctual drive to 
act in a selfless way whereas humans may have elaborate systems of 
complex thought built on foundational principles of altruism and may 
have more conscious control over their decisions and actions, but both 
biological altruism and human morality reflect urges to mitigate selfish 
interests and act in a “selfless” urges which are evolutionarily beneficial 
to have.   
A comparison of human and animal sexual urges is a good parallel 
for morality. Humans have incredibly complex courtship systems and 
in some cases couples could wait years to reproduce.  Humans also can 
have complex emotional issues surrounding reproduction and sexuality 
and there are volumes of theory written about human sexuality just as 
there is about human morality. Most animals have comparatively simple 
courtship systems, mating occurs only when a female is in heat, and 
usually courtship is not an extended process. Yet it would be fallacious 
to say that because humans have emotional and complex conscious 
issues surrounding reproduction and sex in general which are lacking in 
animals that act on instinct, human sexual desire is qualitatively 
different than that found in other organisms, and therefore not 
biological in nature. Most likely, the root causes of human sexual urges 
are biological in nature, influenced though they may be by culture and 
human consciousness. Similarly, I argue, moral feelings and the ability 
to partition the world morally are likely biological in nature although 
culture and human consciousness provide an influence that allows 
humans to construct complex ethical systems and make difficult moral 
decisions involving abstract thinking.   
Secondly, when examining the issue of determinism, some critics of 
evolutionary ethics seem to misunderstand the arguments of contemp-
orary evolutionary ethicists. Evolutionary biologists are not claiming 
that human beings are forced to see certain actions as wrong and others 
as right due only to their biologically constituted nature. E. O. Wilson 
uses the concept of “epigenetic rules” to describe the way in which 
biologically evolved tendencies influence human behavior. Rather than 
strict instinct or determined behavior, epigenetic rules, arising from 
underlying genetic factors, merely guide human development in certain 
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ways. Evolutionary ethicists generally argue that such “epigenetic rules” 
give us a propensity towards moral actions which (unbeknownst to us) 
are also furthering our evolutionary ends (or are residual from our long 
history as foragers when they would have benefited human beings 
evolutionarily). Culture acts upon the framework provided by epi-
genetic rules to give us the varied moral codes that we see throughout 
the world. This influence of culture on biological development occurs 
because, in most aspects of human development, there is a complex 
interaction between environment and genes. Genes are switched off 
and on by external factors and although epigenetic rules may shape 
moral and behavioral development, they are acted upon by external 
forces. Richard Alexander points out that “stages and events in the 
developing organism are inevitably epigenetic – not only influenced by 
the genome as a whole but controlled by feedback from the developing 
phenotype as a whole” (Alexander 1993, page 169). Morality is not, 
therefore, biologically determined, rather an individual’s moral beliefs 
are shaped and influenced by his own thoughts and desires as well as 
the norms of his family and the culture which he or she is exposed to. 
What most evolutionary ethicists would argue is that biology merely 
provides the ability to characterize the world in moral terms and in 
some cases may guide moral development in one direction or the other.  
Another simple confusion to clear up is one regarding intention-
ality in ethics. Evolutionary ethicists, opposed to what some critics 
seem to think, do not argue that humans act consciously to maximize 
their inclusive fitness. This is certainly not something observed in the 
daily practice of morality. The argument I adhere to is that evolution 
has promoted a system of morality in which we feel obligated regard-
less, it seems, of our own desires, to act in certain ways. The universal 
restriction that most humans feel on unprovoked murder does not 
seem to have anything to do with the maximization of reproductive 
fitness. That moral imperative, however, is argued by sociobiologists to 
arise from a long evolutionary history in which those individuals who 
felt a prohibition against unprovoked murder survived better to pass on 
their genes (including the genes for an abhorrence of murder). It may 
even have been more effective, Ruse notes, to have a system of 
morality which holds moral actions as binding no matter what, rather 
than a system of conscious means-ends reasoning regarding biological 
fitness which would allow for more conscious deviation from 
reproductively beneficial moral “laws.” In other words, conscious 
human moral decision-making which does not involve considerations 
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of biological fitness as a desired goal, actually is guided by certain 
evolved propensities which generally lead, unbeknownst to the in-
dividual, to the maximization of reproductive fitness. The entire system 
of moral decision making, in fact, seems to have evolved to maximize 
reproductive fitness.   
Most important for showing that the distinctively human character-
istics of morality arose from evolutionary processes is showing that the 
objective and categorical feelings that human’s associate with morality 
could have been selected for evolutionarily. A sense of an inescapable 
and objectively binding moral imperative such as that which appears to 
underlie human morality as it exists in the world today would be much 
more likely to regulate individuals’ conduct, especially when it comes to 
altruistic acts that do not immediately benefit the organism (but do 
provide long-term benefits that may not be immediately ascertainable 
to the individual). Such a “moral sense” could therefore have been 
selected for, as would moral phenomena such as a sense of guilt. This 
will be discussed further below as evidence for moral error theory. 
My final point regarding evolutionary theory is that human society 
as it exists today seems to have evolved based on moral principles. Part 
of the reason that I have focused in such a detailed way on the nuances 
of the biological theory surrounding the evolution of morality is that I 
hoped to show that the evolutionary mechanisms at work in the 
formation of morality likely were of key importance in the development 
of the incredibly complex social relationships existing among humans. 
The obvious complexity of systems of direct reciprocity (the sort of 
reciprocity discussed by Trivers and Hamilton) and especially systems 
of indirect reciprocity (reviewed above by Nowak and Sigmund), which 
promote selection for detailed social knowledge, complex social 
relationships, and advanced behavioral strategies, likely have led to an 
expansion of human consciousness and social awareness. The devel-
opment of complex social knowledge and behavior that evolutionary 
theory indicates necessarily accompanied strategies of reciprocity based 
on reputation and perception of intent, may be responsible for the 
detailed and layered interactions between humans observed today as 
well as the complexity of human morality. The fact that existent human 
systems of social interaction are foundationally dependent on human 
morality will be of critical importance later in this essay.   
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The Philosophical Implications of an Evolutionary Origin of 
Morality 
 
Ethical Naturalism: A Fallacy 
When examining the philosophical implications of accepting that 
morality as a structure of thought is a result of evolutionary processes, 
it is important to make a distinction between explanation and just-
ifiction. I am using evolutionary ethics in this paper in a descriptive, 
explanatory context. An explanatory description of how morality came 
to be via an examination of evolutionary processes does not necessarily 
have anything to say about what we now ought to do in a prescriptive 
sense. Perhaps the greatest damage done to the field of evolutionary 
ethics has been carried out by the slough of evolutionary “proponents” 
who attempt to erect a prescriptive system of morality based on the 
evolutionary nature of morality. Such “ethical naturalists” and social 
Darwinists commit a serious error when they attempt to equate the 
natural processes by which morality or other social traits form with 
moral goodness. Before expounding on what I see as the correct 
implications to derive from the evolved nature of morality I will briefly 
examine and hopefully refute the position of the ethical naturalist. 
Hume showed in a famous passage of his treatise that a factual 
observation, an is, cannot lead to a prescriptive claim, an ought (Hume, 
1967). All of the attempts to derive a system of prescriptive morality 
from evolutionary descriptions fall prey to the above fallacy noted by 
Hume, despite recent attempts to bypass “Hume’s law.” The problems 
inherent in Robert J. Richards’ arguments for deriving justification for 
morality from evolutionary processes provide a good example of the 
impossibility of deriving an ought from an is (Richards, 1993). Richards 
states bluntly that he believes he is justified in bypassing the is/ought 
barrier demarcated by Hume: “Thus, I also want to show, secondly, 
that there is no general fallacy in arguing from facts to values, from ‘is’s 
to ‘ought’s” (Richards 1993, page 116). Richards tries to use appeal to 
factual information from biblical passages amongst believers as an 
example of how an ought can be derived from an is in common daily 
practice. Richards proposes that a statement like “The Bible says 
fornication is wrong; but fornication is sex outside of marriage. There-
fore, premarital sex ought not be engaged in” (Richards 1993, page 126) 
represents someone using an appeal to a definition of premarital sex (an 
is) to determine that it should be abstained from as a clear case of 
fornication (an ought). This is tricky, but just plain wrong. Biblical 
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language is in its very essence prescriptive because it relies implicitly on 
the background statement that “one ought to obey the Bible,” and 
using factual definitions to determine what is prescribed in the Bible 
and using that to justify how Christians should behave morally, is 
merely making use of an intermediary is to derive an ought from an 
ought. The information in the Bible (prescriptive “ought”s) are used to 
derive moral terms (also “ought”s), and the definition of fornication (an 
is) is merely used to clear up what is meant by prescriptive terms in the 
Bible.   
Having attempted (and failed) to show that the is/ought barrier 
does not apply in moral doctrine, Richards next tries to show that it 
need not prevent the formation of a prescriptive evolutionary ethics 
either. Richards makes the following statement: 
Or consider this likely scene:  An elderly woman is attempting to cross Michigan Avenue at 
5:00 p.m.  Joe comes up next to her.  I say to a companion:  “Joe is extremely altruistic.  He 
sees the lady in distress.  Therefore he ought to act altruistically and help her across.”  Here 
the ought-conclusion has been derived from facts by a rule (Richards 1993, page 128). 
 
This may be a semantically sound sentence, but the way ought is used is 
not a moral one. Peter Woolcock, in examining such arguments, refers 
to such utterances as “descriptive oughts” which predict the outcome 
of a scenario rather than prescribing how someone should act as a 
moral or prescriptive ought does (Woolcock, 1999). Woolcock agrees 
that it is entirely possible to derive a descriptive ought from a descrip-
tive is, as Richards has done in the above example, but still agrees with 
Hume that moving from a descriptive is to a prescriptive ought is a 
fallacy. Richards attempts to address this problem by saying: 
The “ought” derived from the structured context of human evolutionary formation, then, 
will be a moral ought precisely because the activities of promoting the community good and 
of approving altruistic behavior constitute what we mean by being moral (Richards 1993, 
page 129) 
 
This is, again, just plain wrong. What Richards is saying is circular in 
essence: that if we accept that what is moral is what evolution has put 
in place in human nature, i.e., “the activities of promoting the 
community good and of approving altruistic behavior…,” then we will 
see that what we ought to do is act to promote the community good 
and approve altruistic behavior. When what we are trying to do is 
justify why what evolution has made us see as moral is actually moral in 
a prescriptive sense, Richards’ circular argument becomes meaningless. 
Furthermore, as Richard Joyce points out, such arguments commit the 
genetic fallacy of assuming that where an idea originated has import for 
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whether that idea is valid or not (Joyce, 2001).   
Commonplace arguments made by Social Darwinists run into the 
same problems that Richards and other ethical naturalists do. Claiming 
that aggressive, individualistic, or patriarchal policies are justified by 
aggressive, individualistic or patriarchal practices in nature is philosoph-
ically unsound. As seen in arguments against Richards above, there is 
no reason to equate “natural” with “morally right,” and his attempt to 
do so falls prey to Hume’s distinction between is and ought as well as 
the genetic fallacy. I believe that Richards’ claim is typical of most other 
arguments put forth by ethical naturalists and I think I have shown that 
the barrier of is/ought is impenetrable by such reasoning. Even if it 
were shown to be possible in some cases to derive an is from an ought, 
it does not seem so in this instance. Therefore, I hold that the 
arguments of the ethical naturalist and the Social Darwinist can safely 
be discarded at this point. 
 
Evolutionary Theory as Support for Error Theory 
Having shown that the descriptive analysis of the origins of 
morality provided by evolutionary theory is insufficient to provide 
justification for any prescriptive moral system, the question becomes, 
“what import does the evolved nature of human morality have for our 
system of ethics?” I believe that showing that evolutionary processes 
led to our current system of morality effectively shows moral discourse 
to be in error. It is as support for a moral error theory that I will 
examine the implications posed by accepting evolutionary ethics. 
Error theory, in the well-known formulation given by J. L. Mackie, 
holds that our moral language contains an element of “objective 
prescriptivity” which can be shown to be false (Mackie, 1977). When 
we argue morally, Mackie states, we are implicitly invoking objective 
moral standards which are supposed to be universally binding on 
humans. When such invoked moral standards are searched for, how-
ever, they prove to be non-existent, rendering our entire moral system 
to be in error.9 Because all moral utterances rest on chimerical realist 
principles Mackie holds that all moral utterances are false, and invokes 
the term moral error theory to describe human moral systems. Due to 
9 Mackie uses two main arguments to show that such universally binding moral principles are 
nonexistent.  First, in his “argument from queerness,” Mackie points out that if moral facts existed 
they would have to be strange facts indeed, unlike any other we are used to encountering.  
Secondly, Mackie uses an argument from relativity, stating that were such universal moral facts to 
exist we would expect to see much greater agreement across cultures about what constitutes right 
and wrong than currently exists.  
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confusion about what “objective prescriptivity” entails, Richard Joyce 
concludes that “[s]ketched in the above terms, Mackie’s notion of 
‘objective prescriptivity’ is too blunt for a proper argument to be 
conducted...” (Joyce, 2001). Joyce goes on to provide his own inter-
pretation of what “objective prescriptivity” is and what it means for 
morality, and in the end seems to develop a much stronger case for 
moral error theory. 
In The Myth of Morality, Joyce shows that, conceptually, moral 
judgments are categorical and “inescapable” in nature as they are 
intended to apply to individuals universally and regardless of indiv-
iduals’ desires. He believes this to be a non-negotiable property of 
morality, claiming that “[m]orality is not just a list of Does and Don’ts 
backed with punishment. We think that a person is bound by those 
rules whether he accepts them or not – that the rules are, in some 
sense, his rules whether he accepts them or not” (Joyce 2001, page 34). 
He shows, clearly, the difference between moral utterances and other 
prescriptive utterances by contrasting moral oughts with “institutional 
oughts” which are imposed by a society or institution and which are 
not inescapable or universally binding. At the same time, however, 
Joyce argues that “moral inescapability” is not defensible philosoph-
ically because if an individual morally ought to perform an action, he 
must therefore have a reason to perform that action regardless of his or 
her desires, and no such reasons can be found. Joyce argues that 
practical rationality alone could provide such inescapable reasons, yet 
he holds that practical rationality yields at best a system of hypothetical 
imperatives (imperatives depending on an end or a desire: “if Susie 
wants an A, she ought to study”). This is at odds with the categorical 
nature of the moral judgments that humans make, and therefore Joyce 
espouses a moral error theory claiming moral discourse to be in error.   
Having shown, convincingly, that moral discourse is in error due to 
its dependence on non-existent, objective moral imperatives, Joyce 
asks: 
The distinctive authoritativeness which characterizes our moral discourse turns out to be a 
well-entrenched bluff.  But the question remains:  why do we employ these mysterious 
imperatives?  Perhaps the whole point of morally condemning someone is to do so with a 
particular inescapable force, but what is the point of wanting to do that? What has led us 
systematically to commit this error? (Joyce 2001, page 135). 
 
Joyce’s answer is that evolution would most likely lead to the 
development of a feeling of requirement to perform certain actions 
(such as benefit one’s kin) because a feeling that one ought to do 
something in an inescapable moral sense is likely much more effective 
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in motivating individuals to behave in a seemingly altruistic way than a 
system based on strong preferences would be. Accordingly, evolution 
would favor the development of a conscience, guilt, and a “moral 
sense” of the sort that is found in human society.   
That the entire category of human morality could be evolutionary 
in origin, Joyce sees as evidence for his philosophical program, he states 
that:  
But if all that has been described thus far is a genealogy and not a justification, what 
relevance does it have to discussing our present moral discourse?  One conclusion is that, 
contemplating the arguments for an error theory of the previous chapters, it accounts for the 
origin of a widespread and natural mistake, and thus discharges a burden that any error 
theorist owes her critics.  But I will argue that we can draw a stronger conclusion: the very 
fact that morality is the product of natural selection provides evidence in favor of error 
theory” (Joyce 2001, pages 147-148). 
 
In other words, not only does the evolutionary origin of morality justify 
an error theoretical view of morality by providing a plausible ex-
planation of why an erroneous system of morality is seen to be in place 
in humankind, evolutionary theory itself also suggests on its own that 
morality may be in error. This makes intuitive sense: We seem to in-
voke moral standards as though they reflect eternal universal 
prescriptions beyond the confines of human practical reasoning, where-
as evolutionary theory suggests that our moral code evolved merely due 
to its utility for our species’ survival, and therefore could not be reflex-
ive of any eternal “laws” existent outside of the human condition.  It is 
logical, therefore, to apply evolutionary ethics to error theoretical 
depictions of morality because error theory is what evolution itself 
suggests. Applied to Mackie and Joyce’s analyses of morality, evolution-
ary theory provides powerful support for error theory. 
 
What do we do now? 
Having established that morality likely arose from the evolutionary 
process of natural selection and having shown such an origin provides 
support for moral error theory, the next issue to address is what 
implications such a conclusion has for the common practice of human 
morality. Should we abandon the present form of moral discourse and 
employ merely pragmatic or emotive argumentation without the 
invocation of objective moral standards? Is this even an option? Is 
there a way to retain the societal usefulness of morality without the 
sacrifice of truth concomitant with an appeal to nonexistent moral 
standards? Joyce argues in favor of the last option, creating a discourse 
which he terms “moral fictionalism.” Since I accept the premises of 
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Joyce’s argument, I will discuss his conclusion first before moving on. 
Joyce argues that we could, if we were so motivated, abandon the 
use of moral discourse entirely. He argues against this, on pragmatic 
terms: 
Arguing that moral judgments could be abolished is, obviously, a long way from arguing that 
they should be abolished.  The question of whether we should abolish the discourse is a 
practical question, to be assessed according to a cost/benefit analysis of preference 
satisfactions (Joyce 2001, page 172). 
 
Joyce believes that we can retain morality as a sort of “myth,” noting 
the fact that human societies often employ myths that are in disagree-
ment with their wider bodies of knowledge. Joyce argues that we can 
accept moral propositions due to their usefulness to human society 
without believing in them or uttering them with assertive force. He 
believes that the language of morality can remain the same thought its 
proponents should accept it as noncognitive and “fictionalist.” Joyce 
thinks that although his fictionalism may not provide all the benefits 
that “true” morality does, it would still have significant benefits for 
humankind. This is due to the fact that when we merely reason 
instrumentally we will be more likely to disobey certain conclusions 
than if we accept morality.   
I believe that Joyce’s “solution” to the problems that a moral error 
theory poses for traditional morality is inadequate. First of all, Joyce 
himself, in his discussion on evolution, proposes that current human 
morality including the fallacious appeal to objective, inescapably 
binding standards, evolved because practical rationality is not fully 
sufficient to regulate conduct (see Joyce 2001, pages 136-138). Moral 
fictionalism, however, is dependent on practical rationality in that it is 
dependent on all members realizing that it is in their best pragmatic 
interest to adopt morality’s tenets and acting in rational accordance 
with their best interests: 
But what is the strength of moral fictionalism if it does not apply to Gyges? . . . The strength 
of the advice that recommends moral fictionalism is no more and no less than this:  it will be 
in the long-term best interests of ordinarily situated persons with normal human desires 
(Joyce 2001, page 222). 
 
Joyce seems to be contradicting himself, therefore, by proposing a 
system of morality that is dependent on practical rationality, when he 
admits practical rationality to be insufficient to regulate conduct.   
Second, Joyce admits that “…there can be no honest ‘lone 
fictionalist’ … If it is to be viable it must be an attitude that a group may 
take towards a hitherto believed theory.” Supposing that one could 
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rationally convince an entire group of people (unanimity would be 
necessary as one or a few defectors would quickly destroy any benefits 
gained by the fictionalists in the group) to accept fictionalism, some-
thing which seems unlikely to me in any practical sense, fictionalism is 
still far from a sound theory. Moral fictionalism, according to Joyce 
himself, requires the withdrawal of assertive force and he further 
acknowledges that the moral fictionalist has little to say to convince 
someone born without human sympathy, or someone in the situation 
of Gyges who can safely escape detection of any moral transgression 
that he commits.10 Joyce has created a moral system that is fully 
dependent on the compliance of all members, with zero ability to 
regulate others’ conduct within the moral community (no assertive 
force), and nothing to say to those who fall outside the moral com-
munity by not accepting the basic tenets of human morality. When two 
main goals of morality, both evolutionarily and culturally/socially, 
include social control and the regulation of selfish desires, Joyce’s moral 
fictionalism seems ineffectual, if indeed it could ever be put into place 
at all. 
A larger problem that I have with Joyce’s moral project that has 
implications for my own conclusions regarding morality is that Joyce 
assumes that our moral outlook is something completely under our 
rational control. Joyce speaks casually of adopting moral fictionalism as 
though switching something as fundamental as human morality is on a 
par with deciding which coat to put on in the morning.11 This is 
something that many moral philosophers throughout history seem to 
implicitly assume and I think that one of the broader implications of 
accepting the evolved nature of morality is the realization that 
categorizing the world in moral terms is a fundamental part of what it 
means to be human. We may be able to rationally control, to some 
degree, what we see as right and wrong, but that we divide actions into 
such categories seems to be biological and perhaps inviolable. 
Comparatively, it can be scientifically shown that the wavelength of 
light varies continuously, in opposition to the human perception of 
discrete colors, but I defy anyone to argue that I could change the way I 
perceive color to match my rational conclusions. In Joyce’s own 
10 In his Republic Plato tells the story of a Lydian shepherd, Gyges, who comes upon a ring of 
invisibility and uses it to commit moral transgressions undetectably, eventually gaining for himself 
the position of king.  Joyce uses Gyges as an example of an individual who seemingly has no 
pragmatic reason to accept morality’s dictates. 
11 This is especially troubling to me because Joyce himself sees morality as a fundamental 
biological part of human nature.
Macalester Journal of Philosophy 90
analysis the system of morality that humans employ today likely 
evolved for the very purpose of overriding our immediate rational 
conclusions about what we desire (that are often harmful in the long 
run, as discussed above) which seems to suggest that morality may be 
outside the realm of rational control. Thus I take issue with any theory 
that holds that we can choose to accept morality or not based on 
merely pragmatic concerns, or that we can choose to adopt a radically 
new system of morality according to the dictates of reason. 
More interesting to me than Joyce’s own philosophical conclusions 
regarding the adoption of moral fictionalism, is his mention of Hume’s 
“philosophical distress” expressed in Hume’s treatise when his skeptical 
thought has led him into deep angst and inaction. Hume claims himself 
saved by “nature herself” and as Joyce summarizes “he dines, he plays a 
game of backgammon, he is convivial with his friends, and in doing so 
his philosophical torments evaporate. When he returns to his skeptical 
thoughts they seem cold and unengaging, and it is only with intellectual 
effort that he is able to feel their force again” (Joyce 2001, 190). Joyce 
then distinguishes between the conclusions of someone in an “un-
distracted,” “reflective,” and generally philosophical frame of mind and 
someone engaged in daily life. Joyce holds, essentially, that in the 
philosopher’s study or the classroom, the philosopher is engaged in 
critical examination of the principles and “presuppositions of ordinary 
thinking.” The philosopher has therefore departed to a removed 
framework from which the questioning of ordinary thinking is possible. 
Engaged in daily life, such questioning is not possible, for to operate 
within the framework of ordinary thought one cannot simultaneously 
be involved in a critical examination of that framework. Thus, Joyce 
argues, it is not entirely inconsistent to accept one viewpoint in the 
context of philosophical examination and another in other contexts, 
such as daily life or scientific practice. This argument, based on 
contextual distinction, becomes critically important for the philosoph-
ical argument expressed that the end of this essay: I argue below that a 
contextual distinction is made by Hume himself regarding his skeptical 
examinations and I believe that not only is Hume’s view of morality 
remarkably similar to what evolutionary theory predicts, but also that 
Hume’s conclusions regarding skeptical thought can be readily applied 
to human morality as it exists today to yield satisfactory conclusions 
about what should be done in light of a moral error theory. I end my 
paper with an analysis of Humean thought as it applies to evolutionary 
ethics. 
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Humean Philosophy and Evolutionary Ethics 
Hume’s moral writing is empirical in nature; Hume is not setting 
forth a normative doctrine but is instead examining moral attitudes, 
sentiments, and beliefs from an empirical standpoint (see Hume, 1983). 
He makes no attempts at establishing a prescriptive moral philosophy 
and this, combined with the scientific nature of his examinations, is 
likely why his moral philosophy accords well with what is espoused by 
evolutionary theory. This comparison is certainly not new, Ruse notes 
as much in his aforementioned work, but I hope to show that Hume’s 
conclusions regarding epistemology and morality are relevant to an 
examination of evolutionary ethics in light of a moral error theory. 
Comparison of Hume’s moral theory to evolutionary ethics has 
been done satisfactorily by others (see Ruse, 1986), but I will briefly 
state the evidence that is relevant to my further arguments. Firstly, and 
importantly, Hume did not see morality as a humanly created enterprise 
based on philosophical principles of reason. Instead, Hume argued that 
morality is an integral part of human nature that is emotion-based and 
arises in individual sentiments, communicated via “sympathy” among 
humans endowed with similar moral faculties. (See Rayner, 2005 for a 
detailed discussion of my interpretation of Hume’s moral philosophy.) 
Similarly, evolutionary theory essentially believes morality to be based 
in innate human proclivities (epigenetic rules) rather than human 
reason. Hume also held that upon examination one could see that those 
actions which lead to moral “sentiments of approbation” often are 
synonymous with those actions which are useful to man, though Hume 
at no point seems to advocate a normative system based upon utility as 
a utilitarian might. Ruse notes that this is exactly what one would 
expect if morality were evolutionary in origin.  We would have evolved 
to derive pleasure from actions that are biologically favorable: sex, 
parenting, and showing kindness/altruism to others are obvious 
examples. Finally, as Mackie points out, Hume is essentially an early 
proponent of error theory (Mackie refers to Hume’s theory as advoc-
ating what he terms in this case “the Objectification theory,” which is 
just another name for error theory) as Hume believes that we objectify 
phenomena as moral or unmoral while in reality there is no right or 
wrong to be found in the objects or actions themselves (Mackie, 1980).   
There are certainly more comparisons between Humean thought 
and evolutionary ethics to be made, but most important for my 
argument are the ideas that morality is not a product of human reason 
nor operationally dependant on principles of reason, the notion that 
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humankind is instilled with commonalities in its moral sentiments, the 
error theoretical implications in Hume’s moral theorizing, and Hume’s 
relegation of reason to the supplementary role of determining the 
nature of an object desired by moral passions and deciding how to best 
achieve something desired by those passions. As Hume’s thought is 
comparable to an error theoretical view of morality, at least in Mackie’s 
interpretation, and because Hume’s moral observations are in accord-
ance with the predictions of evolutionary ethics, an examination of 
Hume’s philosophical conclusions is beneficial when examining the 
conclusions of evolutionary ethics. 
I think that Hume’s epistemological thought can importantly be 
applied in some instances to his moral beliefs, since according to Ruse 
his epistemology possibly arose from ideas surrounding his moral 
theory. (See Kemp Smith, 1941, and Ruse, 1986.) In Hume’s con-
clusion to An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding he recognizes the 
impossibility of a true philosophical justification of many philosophical 
principles, such as induction, but holds that he cannot suspend the use 
of induction in everyday life as it is a necessary part of human 
perception of the world. He agrees that induction is philosophically 
unsupported but distinguishes this philosophical “sphere” from the 
“sphere” of daily life. I will quote at length from his Enquiry because 
this section forms the backbone of my argument:   
The skeptic, therefore, had better keep within his proper sphere…while he justly insists that 
all our evidence for any matter of fact, which lies beyond the testimony of sense or memory, 
is derived entirely from the relation of cause and effect; that we have no other idea of this 
relation than that of two objects, which have been frequently conjoined together; that we have 
no argument to convince us, that objects, which have, in our experience, been frequently 
conjoined, will likewise, in other instances be conjoined in the same manner; and that 
nothing leads us to this inference but custom or a certain instinct in of our nature…But a 
Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind:  
Or that if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society.  On the contrary he must 
acknowledge, if he will acknowledge any thing, that all human life must perish were his 
principles universally and steadily to prevail…it is true; so fatal an event is very little to be 
dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle. And though a Pyrrhonian may throw 
himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; 
the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave 
him the same, in every point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other 
sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches (Hume, 
1977, page 110-111). 
 
Hume is essentially in agreement here with what Joyce espouses above: 
namely that the context of daily life differs from the context (or 
“sphere”) of philosophical enquiry. Furthermore, Hume considered in-
duction something put in place by nature (something also argued by 
evolutionary epistemology, incidentally) and thus distinct from the 
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context of rational thought: 
…as the operation of the mind, by which we infer like effects from like causes, and vice versa,
is so essential to the subsistence of human creatures, it is not probable, that it could be 
trusted to the fallacious deductions of our reason…it is more conformable to the ordinary 
wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of mind, by some instinct or mechanical 
tendency… (Hume, 1977, page 37). 
 
Taken together, I believe that the two passages above are sufficient to 
derive a coherent philosophical outlook from Hume’s writings which I 
argue is applicable to Hume’s moral thought as well as his epistem-
ology. 
Had Hume had the opportunity to read Wittgenstein he perhaps 
would have explicitly invoked the concept of “language games” to 
explain what he saw as the disparate realms of philosophical 
examination and daily life. (See, for example, Wittgenstein, 1979.) Witt-
genstein shows that there can be no knowledge (and therefore no 
doubt) without assuming certain principles to be fixed, similar to 
Hume’s argument at the end of An Enquiry Concerning Human Under-
standing that holding induction to be beyond doubt is necessary for 
further inquiry. According to Wittgenstein, differing discourses (lan-
guage games) arise in contexts where differing principles are accepted 
as undoubtedly true. Claims that make coherent sense within one 
language game will therefore be inconsistent in a different language 
game founded on differing principles. Accordingly, one could say that 
the language game of philosophical enquiry is based on an underlying 
framework of human logic and reason, and Hume suggests in the quote 
above that this is the proper sphere for the arguments of the extreme 
philosophical skeptic.12 Hume holds that daily life and practice is not 
grounded in human logic, and indeed that the language game of daily 
life is founded on ideas that are verifiably not in strict accord with 
logical structures of thought such as cause and effect and morality, 
which Hume sees as emotion-based and not “conformable to reason” 
(Hume, 1967, page 458). Therefore, when one is operating in the 
language game of daily life it makes no sense to question such things as 
induction because the entire language game of daily life is founded on 
the presupposition that induction is true. In a philosophical context 
12 I am not a Wittgensteinian in the sense that he seems to hold that the philosophical sphere of 
enquiry is meaningless given its attempt to take language out of its intended context.  I am arguing 
here, along with what I see to be Hume’s belief, that it is possible to depart to a philosophical 
frame of mind and examine everyday life from a removed (or skeptical) context, but that such 
examination often will have little or no impact on one’s conduct and beliefs when one is engaged 
in everyday life.   
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that presupposes logic to be valid, morality can be shown (as it is by 
Mackie and Ruse) to be founded on erroneous assumptions of object-
ive and binding moral standards. In discussions and actions within a 
human societal context that is founded on moral principles, however, the 
invocation of morality is acceptable because the validity of moral 
sentiments is a foundational assumption of society, and beyond internal 
doubt. 
My argument concerning morality, then, is this:  If morality can be 
shown to be a biological byproduct that is necessary for societal 
interactions, and not a product of philosophical reasoning or culture, 
then it could apply in daily life even if it is not philosophically 
justifiable. As I argued at the end of the first section of this paper, I 
believe that evolutionary theory shows convincingly that human society 
exists in the form that it does today largely as a result of the evolution 
of altruism (and eventually full-blown moral principles) and the 
resultant changes in human social interaction and consciousness.  
Evolutionary theory, therefore, shows all societal interaction to rest on 
the assumption that moral pronouncements are valid in the form in 
which they are currently made. Hume was able both to question the 
existence of other minds and induction in the context of philosophical 
enquiry, and to play backgammon against a friend unquestioningly 
engaging in induction and assuming his friend to be a rational being, 
while in the context of daily life. Taking the two passages quoted above 
in conjunction with one another, a reader can see Hume showing that 
induction, as an “instinct or mechanical tendency” instilled by nature, 
can be shown to be unsound in a philosophical “sphere,” while still 
being unavoidable and inescapable in daily life. The same, I argue, is 
true for morality. In a context of philosophical examination (Joyce uses 
the context of a classroom), morality can be shown to rest on principles 
that are chimerical in nature. Because morality can be shown by 
evolutionary theory to be an innately human quality that was created, 
and is primarily utilized, within a societal sphere separate from the 
sphere of philosophical enquiry, however, perhaps it can still be 
successfully employed in the sphere in which nature “intended” it to be 
employed. Human society and culture in general presuppose that the 
moral system in use by humans is valid (human society would possibly 
never have formed without moral principles) so in society the 
acceptance and employment of morality and moral argumentation isn’t 
inconsistent, just as the employment of induction and the assumption 
of other minds are not inconsistent in the context of daily life which 
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necessarily presupposes them to be valid. In order to interact in society 
as it exists today, a background acceptance of the validity of morality in 
the “language game” of society is requisite, just as, for example, a 
background acceptance of induction in the “language game” of science 
is requisite for further enquiry according to Hume. By showing morality 
to exist independently of human reason as an innate part of biological 
human nature and an essential part of human society, evolutionary 
ethics validates my above argument. 
 
Conclusions and Further Implications 
Humean and evolutionary theory both argue that humans are 
somewhat similar in their moral and societal nature, but seem to 
recognize implicitly that it would be possible for an individual to exist 
outside of the common human societal context. Lycan believes morality 
to be unavoidable barring a severely alienating influence (Joyce, 2001), 
but even if he is right, such influences do exist. An individual that does 
not participate in the “language game” of society would not necessarily 
have any reason to adopt morality, and individuals operating within the 
language game of society could say little to convince him. Such 
individuals do exist in modern society, I would argue, though they are 
usually labeled as deviant and separated from society in some way. If 
evolutionary ethics has any substantive import, therefore, it is through 
the recognition that morality may depend on commonalities in 
humanity’s biological nature. If this were the case, those of us 
practicing ethical argument in a social context would have reason to 
attempt to regulate those “alienating” influences that Lycan speaks of. 
Such influences could include genetic engineering as well as hard drug 
use, which Lycan mentions.13 Those influences could be seen as im-
moral due to the fact that they could remove moral proclivities from 
the individuals subjected to or participating in them.   
Evolutionary theory has shown that morality is likely a non-
negotiable component of what it means to be human and interact 
socially, and that society likely evolved based around the moral procliv-
ities of human beings (as evidenced by the prevalence in human society 
of altruism, cooperation, reputation-building, gossip, a tendency to 
accumulate detailed social knowledge and apply it to moral decisions, 
13 See, for example Annas, Andrews, and Isai (2002), who argue that human rights depend on 
common humanity.  According to their argument, genetic engineering could change a human’s 
essential biological nature and place them beyond the scope of morality and thus should be 
regulated. 
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and other phenomena important to the practice of morality).  Accord-
ingly, I have attempted to show that all action and argument within a 
societal context must necessarily presuppose morality to be a valid 
system of thought, and therefore must necessarily accept the back-
ground assumptions of morality, such as an implicit invocation of 
“objective prescriptivity,” to be beyond doubt in societal practice.  
Therefore, the fact that in a scientific and philosophical context moral 
utterances can be shown to be in error does not render moral discourse 
within a societal context invalid, as they represent two separate spheres 
of discourse with two separate sets of necessary foundational assump-
tions. It is also certainly possible for an individual to switch between 
“language games” and argue morally within a societal context in certain 
instances, while holding morality to be invalid while operating within a 
philosophical context. Furthermore, substantive moral dis-cussion is 
possible in a context that holds morality to be justified meta-ethically as 
a foundational assumption. I argue that without the complete upheaval 
of society, the implications reached by philosophers and biologists 
regarding the meta-ethical nature of morality can have little direct 
impact on the use of moral discourse in the societal context for which 
it was “intended” and in which it is typically practiced. 
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